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ARGUMENT 
In Utah Code Section 34A~2-413(l)(c), the Legislature sets forth four criteria to be 
considered by the Labor Commission in determining whether or not an applicant is 
permanently totally disabled. Subsection (iv) sets forth five specific criteria, which focus on 
the injured worker, to assess whether the injured worker can perform other work reasonably 
available. The Labor Commission promulgated an administrative rule that purports to permit 
the consideration of additional factors, "location, stability, and wage rate of the work." (Br. 
of Resps. at 1.). Because the administrative rule expands the statute, it is in conflict with 
statutory law, and is therefore invalid. 
McGee and the Labor Commission do not challenge any fact set forth by Petitioners. 
(See Br. of Resps. at 4.) McGee sought permanent total disability benefits. Instead of 
applying the statutory standard found in Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(c)(iv), the Labor 
Commission applied Utah Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C. 
In the administrative proceeding, evidence was presented showing that there was 
gainful work reasonably available to McGee. However, applying Administrative Rule R612-
1-lO.D.l.c. instead of the statute, the Commission concluded that McGee was entitled to 
benefits because the wages for this gainful employment didn't pay enough. 
I. Standard of Review: Correctness 
McGee and the Commission misstate the standard of review. McGee and the 
Commission contend that this Court should concede discretion to the Commission in 
deciding whether the administrative rule is consistent with the statute. (See Br. of Resps. at 
1 
2.) The Commission should not be granted deference on a matter of statutory interpretation. 
Moreover, this Court should not be distracted away from the core issue that the 
administrative rule conflicts with the statute by the efforts of McGee and the Commission 
to move the focus onto the standard of review. 
A. Correctness: statutory interpretation and whether the administrative rule 
conflicts with the statute 
The proper standard of review is correctness. The administrative agency in this case, 
the Labor Commission, is not in a better position than the Judiciary to determine whether an 
administrative rule conflicts with legislation. Determining whether this Administrative Rule 
conflicts with a state statute does not require specialized expertise by the Commission. 
Indeed, this type of conflict between rule and statute is exactly the type of issue that courts 
deal with on a regular basis. To defer to the Commission the power to decide if its own rule 
conflicts with legislation would essentially result in handing over judicial review to the 
Commission. Administrative rules are drafted and promulgated by the Commission with the 
beliefthat they do not conflict with legislation. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-104(1)(2006) 
(stating grant of authority to adopt rules in accordance with Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-l to -17 (2007) (Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act). If 
this Court were to grant discretion to the Commission (the entity that promulgated the Rule 
in the first place) to decide if the rule is consistent with legislation, this Court would 
essentially cede judicial authority to the Commission. 
2 
In some cases, the court gives some deference to an administrative agency when the 
agency's expertise is necessary to decide the issue.1 The issue in the instant proceeding, 
however, is a classic judicial determination requiring no expertise - whether an 
administrative rule conflicts with legislation. McGee and the Commission do nothing more 
than claim that "[t]he Commission is well-suited to this responsibility because of its expertise 
in modern employment relationships and its understanding of the workers' compensation 
system." (Br. of Respondents at 5.) The determination of whether an administrative rule 
conflicts with legislation is a pure question of law which does not require any specific agency 
expertise.2 There is nothing about this issue requiring agency expertise that would merit an 
abuse of discretion standard of review. 
B. No express or implied grant of discretion 
Respondents cite no valid authority to support their contention that the Legislature 
either explicitly or implicitly3 granted the Commission discretion to interpret Section 34A-2-
1
 The abuse of discretion standard of review may also be warranted for factfinding 
or application of the law to the facts. However, the instant case does not involve 
factfinding, nor does the instant case involve application of the law to the facts. Rather, 
the issue is purely a legal one: whether the administrative rule conflicts with a state 
statute. This is a determination of law, not a factual finding or application of the law to 
facts, and therefore the correctness standard must apply. 
2
 Moreover, the Labor Commission is not the State agency responsible for 
vocational rehabilitation. That responsibility falls to the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services. Therefore, the Commission has no expertise germane to whether the rule it 
promulgated conflicts with legislation. 
3
 Although Respondents use the terms explicitly and implicitly, and the case law 
uses the terms expressly and impliedly; Respondents see no legal distinction between the 
terms, and Petitioners equate explicit with express and implicit with implied. 
3 
413(c)(iv). In fact, Utah authority is contrary to Respondents' assertions. The very 
arguments McGee and the Commission make have already been rejected in Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus / Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, _ P.3d 
_ ,
4
 and Esquivel v. Labor Comm' of Utah, 2000 UT 66. 7 P.3d 777. Utah law is clear that 
in this circumstance, the Commission's decision must be reviewed under the correctness 
standard. 
McGee and the Commission's claim of impliedly-granted discretion pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 413(l)(c)(iv) was rejected in Martinez. 2007 UT 42, P.3d _ . McGee and 
the Commission claim that Section 413(1 )(c)(iv) impliedly grants the Commission deference 
on the issue because the statute contains the term "reasonably." (Br. of Resp. at 5, 8-10.) 
However, in Martinez, the Utah Supreme Court explained that subsection 413(l)(c) "only 
gives the Commission discretion to cfind' the facts required to establish the elements of 
permanent total disability." Id. at f 44. Martinez also states, "We . . . hold that the language 
of subsection (c) grants the Commission authority to determine only whether the facts 
presented meet the statute's requirements for a finding of permanent total disability." Id. at 
1142.5 
4
 Martinez was issued after Petitioners filed their opening brief 
5
 In Martinez the Utah Supreme Court makes broad statements regarding the 
interpretation of Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l). These statements are made in the 
context of considering, inter alia, who bears the burden of proof under Section 34A-2-
413(l)(c). Id at % 9. While the context of Martinez differs somewhat from the issue of 
whether the administrative rule conflicts with the statute, the fact remains that the Utah 
Supreme Court interpreted Section 34A-2-413(l)(c) in Martinez, and stated that the five 
statutory factors are what must be considered in deciding whether work is reasonably 
available. Id. at ^ 32 ("These factual considerations inform what is reasonable; its 
4 
Section 413(a)(c)(iv) does not impliedly grant any discretion to the Commission for 
questions of law such as whether an administrative rule conflicts with a statute. The instant 
issue is not one of factfinding, nor does the instant issue involve application of law to facts. 
Rather, the issue is purely a legal one: whether the administrative rule conflicts with a state 
statute. This is a determination of law, not a factual finding or application of law to facts. 
Accordingly, Section 413(l)(c) does not impliedly grant the Commission discretion for 
statutory interpretation. 
McGee and the Labor Commission's claim of expressly-granted discretion pursuant 
to Utah Code Section 34A-1-301, must also be rejected pursuant to EsquiveL 2000 UT 66, 
7 P.3d 777, and Martinez. 2007 UT 42, _ P.3d _ . McGee and the Commission claim that 
Section 34A-1-301 expressly grants the Commission deference because the statute "grants 
the Commission cflill power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the 
law in this chapter . . . ." (Br. of Resps. at 5, 8.) The claim for discretion based on this 
statute was first rejected in Esquivel and affirmed in Martinez. In EsquiveL the court made 
clear that "matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness." Id. at f 13 (brackets and citations omitted). The Esquivel court then clarified 
that Section 34A-1-301 granted no deference to legal determinations, stating: "We have 
never previously viewed [Section] 34A-1-301 as a broad grant of discretion to the Labor 
Commission. In fact, we have, upon numerous occasions... reviewed commission decisions 
parameters are not further defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the case of 
reasonable suspicion, for example."). The court also stated that it reviews the 
"interpretation of section 34A-2-413(l)(c) for correctness," kL at f 46, and it declined to 
ccread[] additional terms into the statute," id. at j^ 53. 
5 
concerning questions of law under the correctness standard." Id at ^ | 17 (citations omitted). 
Then, Esquivel went on to reject the argument for discretion, stating, "We are not convinced, 
and do not conclude, that section 34A-1-301 provides a general grant of discretion to the 
Labor Commission for statutory interpretation." Id at f 18. Moreover, in the recent decision 
of Martinez, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed what it previously held in Esquivel, "that 
Section 34A-1-301 does not grant the Commission discretion for statutory interpretation." 
Id at f 43. Section 34A-1-301 simply affords the Commission discretion to find facts and 
apply facts to the proper law. Determining whether a rule promulgated by the Commission 
conflicts with legislation merits no discretion, but must be reviewed for correctness. 
In the end, this Court should not be distracted from the core issue that the 
administrative rule conflicts with the statute by the efforts of McGee and the Commission 
to direct the focus onto the standard of review.6 Utah law is clear that the proper standard 
of review is correctness. As this Court is well aware, questions of statutory construction are 
matters of law, and the court gives no deference to an administrative agency's interpretation 
of a statute. Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Com'n. 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990). 
6
 Regardless, under either standard of review, for the reasons outlined in 
Petitioners' opening brief and set forth below, the decision should be overturned as error; 
and even if the abuse of discretion standard applied, the Commission's decision would 
also rise to the level of an abuse of discretion. 
6 
II. Statutory Construction: the administrative rule conflicts with the statute 
Petitioners made clear in the opening brief that the instant petition presents an issue 
of first impression, specifically whether Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-lO.D.l.c. is in 
conflict with Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). McGee and the Labor Commission 
muddy the waters regarding the issue that is before the Court, and their interpretation of the 
statute fails to consider all of the statutory language and give effect to each term. 
A. Construing the Statute to give effect to each term 
McGee and the Commission's interpretation of the statute fails to take into 
consideration all of the statutory language. When interpreting statutes, Utah courts "presume 
that the Legislature used each term advisedly/' and thereby must construe statutes to give 
effect to each term. See e.g.. State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8 4 10.44 P.3d 680. Because 
Utah law presumes the Legislature used each term advisedly, all parts of the statute should 
be harmonized so that all terms are relevant and meaningful according to their ordinary 
meaning. It is a court's fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the 
statute. See e.g., Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at f 46, _ P.3d _ . 
McGee and the Commission read the statute to omit the language "taking into 
consideration." They focus solely on the term "reasonably available.'' They claim the 
Commission must merely consider whether work is reasonable available, ignoring the five 
statutory factors as nothing more than suggestions that might be taken into consideration, and 
promulgating a rule that permits consideration of other factors. McGee and the 
Commission's focus on "reasonableness" is demonstrated by their characterization of Rule 
7 
R612-1-10.D.1 as necessary "to interpret and apply [Utah Code Section] 413(l)(c)(iv)'s 
'reasonableness' requirement." (Br. of Resps. at 1.) They further state that the Commission 
must "determin[e] what 'reasonable' means," and that whether the administrative rule 
conflicts with the statute "depends on the meaning of'reasonable' as the word is used in [the 
statute]." (Br. of Respondents at 2.) However, the statutory language does not merely ask 
the Commission to decide what is "reasonable." The statutory mandate to the Commission 
is to evaluate whether "the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking 
into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical 
capacity, and residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2~413(c)(iv) (1997) 
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Legislature has already defined what factors are to be 
considered in determining whether other work is "reasonably available." Because the rule 
avoids the statutory factors and purports to permit consideration of other non-statutory 
factors, the rule expands on the statute and is improper and invalid. 
Additionally, in Martinez the Utah Supreme Court stated that the five statutory factors 
are what must be considered in deciding whether work is reasonably available. In discussing 
the five statutory factors, the court stated, "These factual considerations inform what is 
reasonable; its parameters are not further defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the 
case of reasonable suspicion, for example." Id at f 32. In other words, Martinez directs that 
whether work is reasonably available is determined by applying the five statutory factors, and 
nothing else. 
8 
McGee and the Commission also read the statute to omit the language "the employee 
cannot perform other work." Thus, by omitting consideration of this phrase and the five 
statutory factors, their interpretation focuses almost exclusively on whether potential future 
work is reasonable in light of its wage, shifting the focus away from the employee and his 
or her ability to work. The statutory language, considers the employee, and whether "the 
employee [can] perform . . . work," considering the employee's "age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." In other words, instead of 
following the statutory language that keeps the employee's ability to work in mind, and 
whether the employee is able to function; the Commission's misinterpretation leads it to 
focus on future available work and what the work offers. A proper interpretation harmonizes 
all of the phrases and terms of the statute. It is improper for McGee and the Commission to 
consider solely whether future potential jobs are reasonable in light of an administrative rule 
that considers whether the future potential jobs pay a wage greater than the state average 
weekly wage. Rather, the full, harmonized reading of the statute requires greater focus on 
the employee, specifically whether the individual can perform other work, taking into 
consideration the employee's "age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and 
residual functional capacity." 
McGee and the Commission over-generalize Petitioners' position, arguing that 
Petitioners insist that the Commission has no discretion to consider anything outside of the 
five statutory factors. (Br. of Resps. at 13.) Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) states what shall 
be considered by the Labor Commission in determining whether an employee is permanently 
9 
totally disabled. While some considerations may exist within those factors, the so-called 
"subsidiary considerations" alleged by McGee and the Commission are not statutory factors, 
nor are they subsidiary considerations to the statutory factors. 
The Labor Commission is statutorily mandated to evaluate whether "the employee 
cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's 
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional 
capacity." § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (emphasis added.) Within these five factors there may be 
subsidiary considerations such as similarities or differences between an employee's past 
work experiences, or changes over time in an employee's education, or changes over time 
in medical capacity. However, the statute makes no mention of the "subsidiary 
considerations" claimed by Respondents - gross income, wage rates, or the state average 
weekly wage; the subsidiary considerations characterized by McGee and the Commission 
as "location, stability, and wage rate of the work." (See Br. of Resps. at 1 ("location, 
stability, and wage rate of the work"; 5-6 ("1) the stability and regularity of the work; 2) the 
work's location; and 3) the wage attached to the work"; 13 "1) stability, 2) location, and 3) 
wage").) Because Administrative Rule R612-1 -10.D. 1 .c purports to permit consideration of 
these additional factors, it impermissibly expands the statute, shifting the focus away from 
the injured worker and onto possible future work, and is therefore invalid. 
McGee and the Commission appear to abandon the position they took in the 
administrative proceeding. In its final order, the Appeals Board reasoned that Administrative 
Rule R612-1-10.D.1 took "a broad[] view of the statutory term 'past work experience.'" 
10 
(Order of Dec. 29, 2006, at p.3.) The Commission reasoned that the term "past work 
experience" permitted consideration of other aspects besides work experiences or duties, 
including "the location of the injured worker's residence,... previous wage levels, and the 
availability and regularity of alternative work." (Id.) The Commission's reasoning must 
be rejected. The consideration of past work experience does not permit consideration of 
current wages. The evaluation of how the potential wage of potential future employment 
compares to the current state average weekly wage does not take into account any aspect of 
past wages, much less "past work experience." 
The Legislature used the term "past work experience" advisedly. The term "past" 
does not imply in any way the consideration of current available wages, nor does it suggest 
consideration of the "current state average weekly wage." Utah Admin. Code R R612-1-
lO.D.l.c. (2007). The consideration of "past work experience" also does not suggest 
consideration of wages. Experience is defined as "practical knowledge, skill, or practice 
derived from direct observation of or participation in events or in a particular activity [;] the 
length of such participation <has 10 years [experience] in the job>." (See "Experience," 
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993)). If the Legislature had wanted to 
permit consideration of wages in conjunction with consideration of experience, it would have 
said so. It did not. 
McGee and the Labor Commission tacitly admit that the Commission considered three 
non-statutory factors. McGee and the Commission acknowledge that "[t]he Commission 
promulgated Rule R612-1-10.D.1 to identify the subsidiary considerations . . . . These 
11 
[subsidiary] considerations include the location, stability, and wage rate of the work." (Br. 
of Respondents at 1; see also 5-6,13.) Nowhere in the statute does the Legislature state that 
the Commission is to consider "location, stability, and wage rate of the work." Rather, the 
Legislature directs the Commission to "tak[e] into consideration the employee's age, 
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." The 
alleged factors of "location, stability, and wage rate of the work,"are not statutory factors. 
Moreover, they are not "subsidiary" to the five statutory factors of age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. 
Any claim that the additional factors of "location, stability, and wage rate of the 
work,"are "subsidiary considerations" to the statutory factors has no merit. The location of 
possible future work cannot be a "subsidiary factor" of age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. Location of future work is not a secondary 
consideration that must be taken into account in evaluating the employee's age, education, 
past work experience, medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. The stability of 
possible future work cannot be a "subsidiary factor" of age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. Whether future work is likely to be 
constant or consistent does not flow from evaluating the employee's age, education, past 
work experience, medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. The wage rate of 
possible future work cannot be a "subsidiary factor" of age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. How much a potential future job pays, and 
whether the wage is greater than the state average weekly wage, is not a secondary 
12 
consideration to an employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, or 
residual functional capacity. Moreover, read in context of one another, the statutory factors 
all point to consideration of the employee's health and past work experience. Consideration 
of purported "subsidiary factors" that relate to possible future work and the wage rate of that 
work cannot reasonably be considered subsidiary or secondary to the statutory factors. 
McGee and the Commission fail to acknowledge that the Labor Commission has no 
inherent authority apart from the legislative grant. All powers, rights, duties, and 
responsibilities of the Utah Labor Commission are granted by the Utah Legislature. Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-1-103 (1997). The statutory language is clear: The Labor Commission 
is statutorily mandated by Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) to evaluate whether "the employee 
cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's 
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional 
capacity." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (1997) (emphasis added). The Commission 
is a creature of statute and must comply with the statutory mandate or seek modification of 
the statute with the Legislature. 
B. The administrative rule conflicts with the statute 
The administrative rule is invalid because it conflicts with the statute. "It is a long-
standing principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its 
governing statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993). An administrative rule that is out of harmony with a 
statute is invalid. Id. 
13 
Because Administrative Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I is out of harmony with Section 34A-2-
413(l)(c)(iv), the rule is invalid. The statute's plain language does not provide for 
consideration of "location, stability, and wage rate of the work"; and the Commission's 
application of the rule also impermissibly expands the statute. 
1. Plain language 
Comparing the plain language of the statute with the administrative rule, the 
administrative rule sets forth additional considerations beyond the five statutory criteria. The 
statutory language reads, in relevant part: 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled,.. . 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, 
taking into consideration the employee's [1] age, [2] education, [3] past 
work experience, [4] medical capacity, and [5] residual functional 
capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (1997) (emphasis and brackets added). Utah 
Administrative Code R612-1-10.D reads as follows: 
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and definitions apply: 
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other 
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a 
claimant if such work meets the following criteria: 
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the 
claimant's community would consider to be a typical or acceptable 
commuting distance, or is within the distance the claimant was traveling 
to work prior to his or her accident; 
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and 
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to: 
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of 
the accident the claimant was earning more than the state 
average weekly wage then in effect; or 
14 
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the 
accident, if the employee was earning less than the state 
average weekly wage then in effect. 
Utah Admin. Code R612-1 -10.D. 1 .c (2007) (emphasis added.) If the Legislature had wanted 
to permit consideration of wages in conjunction with consideration of experience, it would 
have said so. It did not. Or if it had wanted to permit consideration of other factors, it would 
have said "taking into consideration, among other things, the employee's " Again, it did 
not. Accordingly, from a straightforward textual analysis, the administrative rule improperly 
expands the statute and must be invalidated by this Court. 
2. Utah case law 
McGee and the Commission acknowledge that the Commission's application of the 
rule included the analysis of purported "subsidiary considerations"- "location, stability, and 
wage rate of the work." This is an improper application. 
In attempting to distract this Court away from whether the administrative rule 
conflicts with the statute and onto the standard of review, McGee and the Commission 
contend that three cases cited by Petitioners are inapplicable: Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit 
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993); Draughon v. Dep't of 
Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 93 5 (Utah App. 1999), and Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 762 P.2d 1119 (Utah App. 1988). McGee and the Commission claim that these cases 
do not apply because they do not involve a situation in which the administrative agency was 
granted discretion to interpret the statute. (Br. of Resps. at 10.) This argument fails. 
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First, Respondents' claim of inapplicability makes little sense. McGee and the 
Commission argue that the cases are inapplicable because they apply the correctness standard 
of review rather than the abuse of discretion standard, allegedly because there was no grant 
of discretion.7 As noted above, abuse of discretion is not the correct standard of review. 
Therefore, the cases cited by Petitioners are applicable because they apply the proper 
standard of review - correctness. 
Second, the cases are applicable and good law. Sanders Brine Shrimp and Draughon 
both hold that administrative rules which depart from statutory terms impermissibly modify 
the statute. Crowther articulates the longstanding Utah law that administrative regulations 
may not conflict with legislation. 
In Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, the Utah 
Supreme Court invalidated an administrative rule that improperly defined who was entitled 
to a tax exemption. Instead of setting forth and applying the statutory criteria, the 
"Commission relied upon an administrative rule that impermissibly narrowed the availability 
of the exemptions." IdL at 1304. In Draughon v. Dep't of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT 
App 42, 975 P.2d 935, a civil service worker was reassigned pursuant to an administrative 
rule permitting "involuntary reassignments." Id at f 1. The "involuntary reassignment" as 
defined by the administrative rule violated the statutory prohibition against "demotions." Id, 
Respondents fail to note in their reliance on Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), that the Court relied on the correctness-of-error standard based 
on well established principles of statutory construction, which applies here to the 
unambiguous statute. Id. at 589. 
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at f5. This Court invalidated the rule because it purported to create new administrative 
criteria different from the statute. Id. Crowther simply states longstanding Utah law that an 
agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statutes, and that an administrative rule 
that is out of harmony with a statute is invalid. 762 P.2d at 1122. There is nothing about the 
issuance of the Crowther opinion "prior to the 'standard of review' jurisprudence 
subsequently articulated [in other cases]" that invalidates this longstanding law. 
These cases require invalidation of Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.I.e. The 
administrative rule, both on its face and as applied by the Commission, improperly modifies 
the statutory factors. The five statutory factors for evaluating what constitutes "other work 
reasonably available," include "age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and 
residual functional capacity." The administrative rule purports to permit the consideration 
of gross income, current available wage rates, or the current state average weekly wage -
factors that Respondents themselves characterize as "subsidiary considerations" of "location, 
stability, and wage rate of the work." (Br. of Resps. at 1, 13.) The administrative rule is 
invalid because it enlarges the statutory criteria and thereby improperly modifies the statute. 
C. The Labor Commission's argument is more properly made to the 
Legislature 
The Labor Commission's position that it should be able to consider these additional 
factors is properly submitted to the Legislature as an attempt to change the statute. See, e.g., 
Color Country Mgmt v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, f43, 38 P.3d 969 (stating in 
context of denial of argument for additional procedures and considerations, that the 
petitioner's arguments "are best directed to the Legislature"); Rekward v. Industrial Comm'n 
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ofUtah, 755 P.2d 166,169 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating in context of denial of benefits due 
that "[although we sympathize with [the applicant's] unfortunate situation, the problem must 
be solved by the legislature and not this Court."). If the Labor Commission wants to consider 
the stability of possible future work, the work's location, and the wage attached to the 
possible future work, the Labor Commission should persuade the Legislature to have these 
factors enacted as statutory considerations. 
D. Claiming benefits and asserting the purpose of the Workers 
Compensation Act is to provide benefits to injured workers does not 
satisfy the requirements of the Act 
McGee and the Commission claim that the administrative rule is consistent with the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act because the rule supports a societal purpose of the Act -
providing compensation to injured workers. (Br. of Resps. at 11-12.) Although providing 
compensation to injured workers may be a general purpose of the Act, providing 
compensation is not automatic for each case. This argument, that the injured employee 
should recover because the workers' compensation system is meant to provide compensation 
to injured employees, could be made in any workers compensation proceeding; and if it were 
adopted, the requirements of the Act would have no meaning. 
This over-simplified position fails to acknowledge, however, that before the employee 
may receive workers' compensation benefits, the employee must satisfy the requirements of 
the workers' compensation system. An employee does not simply make a claim, which then 
requires an employer or insurer to write out a check for the claimed benefits simply because 
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the workers' compensation system is meant to compensate injured employees. The employee 
must satisfy the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act.8 
In the instant case, Respondents maintain that McGee does not satisfy the 
requirements of the Act for obtaining permanent total disability benefits. The award of these 
benefits was improper because the Administrative Rule applied by the Labor Commission 
in awarding the benefits is invalid; it conflicts with state legislation. The ALJ held that 
available, gainful employment was unacceptable solely because the jobs did not pay enough 
money - they did not provide a wage at or above the current State average weekly wage that 
Rule 612-1-10.D.1 purports to require. The statute, however, permits consideration of age, 
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity; it does 
not provide for consideration of gross income, available wage rates, or the current State 
average weekly wage. Therefore, the Rule improperly expands the statute. As indicated by 
the ALJ, the jobs identified were appropriate given McGee's work injury (residual functional 
8
 In fact, the policy and purpose of returning workers to the workforce can be used 
to support Petitioners' position. Rejecting gainful employment because it pays less than 
the current state average weekly wage is contrary to the policy and purpose of returning 
citizens to the workforce. Utah Code Section 34A-8-102 states that the Utah Injured 
Worker Reemployment Act "is intended to promote and . . . assist the injured worker in 
returning to the work force as quickly as possible." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-8-102 (1997). 
Section 34A-2-413(6)(a)(i) specifically states that reemployment activities are to be 
undertaken "pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act." The 
Petitioner's argument that the difference between the standards governing the first and 
second step proceedings cannot be confused also lacks support. On its face, the argument 
makes no sense that different standards would apply to two steps in the same process. 
However, the subsistence benefits, on which Petitioners rely, cease upon a return to 
gainful employment. Therefore, those benefits do not justify a different standard. 
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capacity) and his transferable skills (past work experience). The only deficiency identified 
by the ALJ was the lower wage provided by these jobs. Because the Commission lacks 
authority to enact and rely on a Rule that expands the statute, the award of permanent total 
disability benefits must be overturned. Just because the Act's purpose is to secure 
compensation for injured employees does not mean that McGee has satisfied the 
requirements of the Act, or that the Labor Commission did not err. 
E. The Commission's error in applying the invalid administrative rule and 
failure to apply the statutory factors has been raised all along 
McGee and the Commission attempt to avoid the fact that the Commission's orders 
(both from the ALJ and the Appeals Board) failed to set forth and apply the statutory factors; 
they claim failure to set forth and apply the statutory factors was never raised in the 
administrative proceeding. (Br. of Resps. at 16-17.) This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, Petitioners maintained all along through the administrative proceeding that the 
Commission applied the wrong law (an invalid rule) and, therefore, failed to apply the 
statutory factors. The Court should not be misguided into thinking that the issue was not 
raised in the administrative proceeding. It comes as no surprise to McGee and the 
Commission that Petitioners argue that the Commission failed to apply the proper statutory 
criteria. However, McGee and the Commission attempt to avoid the issue by claiming that 
the language and authority used in the opening brief was not part of the administrative 
Motion for Review. (Br. of Resps. at 16, quoting Opening Br. of Petitioners at 17-18.) The 
fact of the matter is that Petitioners identified legal authority to this Court to support their 
position for which Respondents have no response other than to attempt to avoid the issue. 
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The fact that Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986), was not cited to the 
Appeals Board does not mean that the issue of applying an invalid rule instead of the proper 
statutory factors was not raised. The argument that the Commission failed to apply the 
statutory factors was raised all along. 
In Norton, the Industrial Commission's ruling was invalidated because it failed to set 
forth and apply the proper statutory factors. Id. at 1026, 28. At the time, to determine 
whether a worker was permanently, totally disabled, the Commission was required to 
consider the worker's age, sex, education, economic and social environment, and medical 
impairment. Id. at 1027. The Commission "failed... to carry out its task" because it failed 
to apply the required criteria. Id. The Labor Commission failed to set forth and apply the 
proper factors in the instant case. 
Second, even if the Court is inclined to believe that the ALJ's failure to apply the 
statutory criteria was not raised to the Appeals Board, the Appeals Board's failure to set forth 
and apply the statutory criteria is properly raised to this Court. The Appeals Board is the 
ultimate finder of fact in this case. See, e.g.. Carter v. Labor Comm'n Appeals Board, 2006 
UT App 477, f 16,153 P.3d 763. Therefore, this appeal is Petitioners' first and only chance 
of addressing deficiencies in the Appeals Board's Order. Instead of applying the statutory 
factors, the Appeals Board simply defended the decision to follow the administrative rule. 
(R. 0201.) In so doing, the Appeals Board failed to apply the statutory criteria. Because of 
this, Norton requires the Commission's order to be reversed. This Court should not permit 
McGee and the Commission to sidestep this authority. 
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F. Other portions of the Administrative Rule have been invalidated 
McGee and the Commission complain that Petitioners reminded the Court that 
subsection C of Administrative Rule R612-1-10 has already been invalidated. McGee and 
the Commission claim that this Court has "withdrawn support" from Target Trucking v. 
Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 70, ^ [6,108 P.3d 128, and that Petitioner's reference to it 
is "misleading." (Br. of Respondents at 17-18.) This argument has no merit. 
Petitioners cited Target Trucking to remind the Court that: (1) an administrative 
body's rules must conform to, rather than be inconsistent with, statute; and (2) subsection C 
of the administrative rule at issue has already been invalidated. In Target Trucking, this 
Court concluded that Administrative Rule 612-1-10.C.1 .c was invalid because it conflicted 
with the statute.9 Id. at Tff 3-6. There is nothing "misleading" about citing this case. 
Petitioners explained in their opening brief why the claim that "this Court has 
withdrawn support from the Target decision" is erroneous. Any disagreement with Target 
Trucking has to do with when an agency action is final. Petitioners explained in their 
opening brief: 
. . . [Ameritemps. Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, 128 P.3d 31] 
noted that while Target Trucking was correct in the general rule requiring the 
invalidation of an administrative rule that conflicts with legislation, the Target 
Trucking opinion failed to apply the three-part test adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT 
40, ^ [16,999 P.2d 17, to determine when an agency action is final. Regardless 
9
 The administrative rule stated that a preliminary determination of permanent 
total disability was a final agency action for purposes of appellate review, while the 
statute stated that such a finding was not a final action for purposes of appellate review 
unless agreed to by the parties or until a reemployment plan was considered. 
22 
of any confusion as to the standard for determining whether an agency action 
is final, the specific holding of Target Trucking remains clear: the 
administrative rule in Target Trucking was properly invalidated because 
administrative rules must conform to, rather than be inconsistent with statutes, 
and when an administrative rule conflicts with a statute, the rule must yield to 
the statute." 
(Opening Br. of Petitioners at 25, n. 3.) Target Trucking was not overturned; it is still good 
law for the proposition that when an administrative rule conflicts with a statute, the rule must 
yield to the statute. The only issue with Target Trucking is that it failed to apply the three-
part test of Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT 40, f 16, 999 P.2d 17, 
a test that is inapplicable to the instant case. Thus, Respondents' allegations that Target 
Trucking is inapplicable or misleading are simply unfounded and without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Instead of applying the statutory standard found in Utah Code Section 34A-2-
413(c)(iv) which sets forth statutory criteria that must be analyzed and applied in evaluating 
whether an employee is permanently disabled, the Labor Commission applied Utah 
Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C. This Administrative Rule purports to permit 
consideration of factors beyond the statutory factors, and therefore conflicts with the 
statutory standard. The Administrative Rule must be invalidated because it goes beyond the 
statutory mandate. 
Accordingly, the Labor Commission's determination of permanent total disability 
must be reversed. Additionally, the Utah Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.1 must be 
declared invalid as an impermissible amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act. 
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